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A B S T R A C T
In the last decades of the 20th Century, a large consensus emerged over the effect of 
technological change on wage distribution. The core of this theory becomes the backbone 
of a scientific paradigm that attempts to give an explanation for most of the open issues 
in currently developed economies, from rising of inequality in the USA to European 
unemployment, and from the different patterns of productivity to the institutional change. 
The dawn of this wisdom is reviewed, as well as the research program that consolidated 
it, with particular focus on the elements of internal coherence. The debate raised by this 
perspective is discussed and an explanation is presented on how the mainstream analysis 
was able to resist the critiques and translate itself into a coherent policy agenda. The 
alternatives approaches are reviewed, showing the lack of coherent framework. The article 
offers a epistemological point of view, since it shows that the reasons for the success are 
mainly rooted in the domain of competing scientific approaches.
© 2014, Konrad Lorenz University Foundation. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. This is an 
open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons CC 
BY-NC ND Licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). 
Revisión crítica del debate tecnología-desigualdad
R E S U M E N
En las últimas décadas del siglo xx ha habido un gran consenso sobre el efecto del cambio 
tecnológico en la distribución salarial. El núcleo de esta teoría se convierte en la columna 
vertebral de un paradigma científico que intenta dar una explicación a la mayor parte de 
las cuestiones abiertas en las actuales economías desarrolladas, desde el aumento de la 
desigualdad en desempleo de Estados Unidos a Europa, y de los diferentes patrones de 
productividad al cambio institucional. Se revisa el surgimiento de este conocimiento, así 
como el programa de investigación que lo consolida, con especial atención a los elementos 
de coherencia interna. Se trata el debate que surge desde esta perspectiva y se presenta una 
explicación de cómo el análisis de la corriente principal fue capaz de resistir las críticas y 
traducirse en una agenda política coherente. Se revisan abordajes alternativos, mostrando 
la falta de un marco coherente. El artículo ofrece un punto de vista epistemológico, desde 
donde se muestra que las razones del éxito se originan principalmente en enfoques 
científicos en competencia.
© 2014, Fundación Universitaria Konrad Lorenz. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L.U. 
Este es un artículo de acceso abierto distribuido bajo los términos de la Licencia Creative 
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This paper reviews a large amount of literature over the 
analysis of wage distribution in the United States. Its main 
novelties stand in that it puts together three or four strands 
of literature that usually are kept distinguished, and also in 
that the bottom line is epistemological. 
In fact, the last decades were the dawn of a transatlantic 
consensus in the academy (Atkinson, 2001) over the diagnosis, 
causes, and solutions for the raise of inequality. The seeds 
for this theoretical hypothesis are rooted in the debate 
over the role played by technology in shaping US wage 
distribution. This research program becomes from the very 
beginning a self contained paradigm, where the direction of 
investigation was that of the normal science (Kuhn, 1962), i.e. 
devoted to overcome the difficulties without questioning the 
assumptions over which the paradigm itself was built. 
The main consequence was the ability to translate this 
theoretical framework into a discourse highly influential 
in the political debate, both in the US and in Europe. Even 
though the use of alternative frameworks of analysis is now 
widespread inside the literature and, as we will see, some of 
the critiques are actually decisive, no coherent and influential 
agenda emerged from them.
The paper is organized as follows: the following section 
reviews the prodromes of the normal science, the empirical 
analysis of the data based on the paradigmatic theoretical 
framework; section III describes the paradigm; section IV 
presents the critiques based on empirical problems; section 
V presents the alternative explanations advanced, and finally, 
section VI concludes.
The beginning of the story: some empirical 
analyses
At the beginning of the nineties, it was already clear that 
wage inequality was rising. Katz and Murphy (1992) analyzed 
data for the period 1967-1987, using a sample from March 
CPS. Using a standard Mincerian augmented human capital 
regression they tried to account for the facts in a standard 
demand and supply framework. The gender and the black-
white gap, the most evident episodes of segmentation in the 
US labor market, were shrinking, but inequality was rising 
along other dimensions. The attention was captured by 
the educational premium, growing fast in the eighties, in a 
period in which the US, like all the other OECD countries, 
were facing a change in the composition of demand raising 
the educational level. 
Topel (1997) shows that the share of college educated in the 
labor force jumps from thirty to forty percent in a decade (the 
eighties). At the same time, Katz and Murphy (1992) obtained 
that the skill premium decreased during all the seventies 
(they indicated a log change, multiplied by 100, from 1971 to 
1979 of –10.4) and increased during the eighties (12.4 from 1979 
to 1984). The total effect is positive (5.4 from 1967 to 1987). 
How can the two stylized facts, a raise in the relative wage 
and a decrease in relative scarcity, be reconciled?
In a standard demand and supply framework, as 
the one explicitly taken by Katz and Murphy (1992), the 
parallel increases in wage and supply can be justified only 
in presence of a demand shift. That paper put together as 
possible explanations the globalization with a specialization 
effect (favoring skilled labor intensive products), a possible 
preference evolution towards more skilled intensive 
productions generating a sectorial reallocation and finally 
a technological drift favoring educated workers (skill biased 
technological change, i.e. innovative activity favoring the 
relative productivity of skilled workers). They shared the view 
that a sort of long movement of labor demand towards highly 
educated labor was in place.
According to Juhn et al. (1993), the stylized facts should 
be correctly identified. In their words (Juhn et al., 1993:412):
“Our conclusion is that the general rise in inequality and 
the rise in education premia are actually distinct economic 
phenomena.” 
As they said, there is a timing problem: the increase in 
within group wage inequality leads the increase in education 
premium by a decade. Secondly, the between group inequality 
seems to account for only one third of the overall inequality. 
Of course, since the setup is the same, they accepted a thesis 
of a demand shift favouring skilled workers.
The novelty of the picture was the contemporaneous 
presence of an increase in dispersion and a stagnation of the 
mean: a polarization of the labour market that was destroying 
the middle class jobs. According to Levy and Murnane (1992), 
which reviewed the literature over the eighties, this was 
the historical curiosum that drove back the attention over 
inequality.
A large strand of literature tr ied to pass from the 
description to the assessment of the alternatives. Bound 
and Johnson (1992), for example, used various measures to 
decompose the changes according to the contributions of 
tastes, trade, institutions, and technology. The latter was 
indicated as the main factor, but the explanation appears 
methodologically weak. The approach followed is that 
of treating technology as the residual, so weaknesses of 
other explanations immediately becomes its strength, but 
identification does not occur because of a standard problem 
of omitted variables. Quoting Bresnahan (1999), technology 
becomes a Rorschach bolt in which you can see what you 
want.
Apparently, stronger evidence in favour of technological 
determinants comes from some other studies: Berman et 
al. (1994), Berman et al. (1998), and Machin and Van Reenen 
(1998). The first one constrained the analysis to the US, 
while the other two analyze other OECD countries in order 
to control for different institutional frameworks, but all of 
them are limited to the manufacturing sector. This last choice 
has a positive and a negative consequence: on the one side 
it is possible to address explicitly the innovative activity, e.g. 
through measures of R&D expenditure, on the other side, it 
may raise problems of generalization. 
Berman et al. (1994) assessed the role played by technology 
using both a decomposition technique and a standard 
regression framework. The authors are particularly interested 
in comparing the effects of trade and technical change. They 
suggest that the strong correlation between the within 
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industry skill upgrading and both R&D expenditure and 
computerization provides direct evidence of biased technical 
change. They suggested that evidence on the within industry 
skill upgrading can be seen as a signal of the presence of 
a skill biased technical change with a pervasive nature all 
around the industrialized world. Their line of reasoning is 
unclear: for example, they presented as empirical evidence 
in favour of skill biased technical change some case studies 
in which innovation is deemed to reduce unit labor cost, 
which is certainly a standard feature of innovation, but 
from which we cannot infer that innovation is raising the 
relative productivity of skilled labour (Howell, 1999). Even 
more important, Machin and Van Reenen (1998), Berman et 
al. (1994), and Berman et al. (1998) are all using the change 
in the share of non-production workers in the wage bill as a 
measure of skill upgrading, which may induce tremendous 
risks of measurement errors.
The theoretical background of these works presumes that 
technical change is affecting wage differentials through 
the presence of complementarity among capital inputs and 
skills, a setup that is now the orthodoxy to interpret the 
changes that are occurring in the US. Sample limitations are 
serious for many of the empirical exercises in support of this 
theoretical hypothesis. Berman et al. (1994) argue that both 
outsourcing and production workers are over-represented 
in manufacturing, thus inference is legitimate since 
manufacturing is an upper bound of what is happening in the 
rest of the economy. However, the dynamics involving the rest 
of the economy can be different and external validity can be 
minimal. The second point concerns the neglect of the supply 
of skills,* which seems to have a weight especially in the 
comparison between the US and the EU experiences; in fact 
some of the demographic structural facts are different (e.g. 
the arrival on the labor market of the baby boom generation 
has different timings).
Autor et al. (1998) are certainly one of the milestones 
for the technological explanations of inequality. Although 
very cautiously, they suggest an acceleration of skill biased 
technological change in the 1980s (but are dubious over a 
confirmation of the trend in the subsequent decade) and 
identify in the computer (as in the provocative title) the main 
factor beyond it. In their words: 
“Although the strong observed conditional correlations 
of computer measures and the growth in the relative 
utilization of highly educated workers may not just 
reflect causal relationships, it seems clear that whatever 
is driving the rapid rate of within-industry skill upgrading 
over the past few decades is concentrated in the most 
computer-intensive sectors of the US economy” (Autor et 
al., 1998:1203).
Another set of empirical research on the topic was 
inaugurated by Blau and Kahn (1996). This alternative 
approach is closer in spirit to the standard labor economics 
one, assuming a labor market nested into a complex set of 
institutions as opposed to the competitive assumptions of the 
SBTC models. Consequently with these different theoretical 
backgrounds the latter focuses more on differentials (which 
conveys the idea of market clearing wage), while the former 
has an emphasis on the overall distribution, as explicitly 
stated in their conclusions by DiNardo et al. (1996). According 
to Blau and Kahn (1996), the demand-supply movement seems 
not to be adequate to explain the global story (US and other 
countries). They suggest that unions in the US are less able to 
directly and indirectly (through spillover effects) reduce wage 
inequality and underlined the role played by mechanisms 
such as wage centralization.
DiNardo et al. (1996) try to assess the magnitude of the 
effects of de-unionization and minimum wage decline. The 
latter shows a striking downward movement of the eighties 
is striking, as shown by Card and DiNardo (2002). They 
used a semiparametric approach, based on Blinder-Oaxaca 
variance decomposition. This technique has been used by 
many labour economists and basically consists in building 
counterfactual variances that one would have observed if the 
suspected event had not existed. General equilibrium effects 
are excluded by assumption, e.g. DiNardo et al. (1996) assume 
that minimum wage is not affecting either employment or the 
distribution above the minimum wage threshold. Under these 
assumptions, institutional factors accounted for three fourth 
of the overall change (they investigated the period 1979-1988).
Regardless of the methodological critiques, there is a 
timing problem with their explanation: the reversal of the 
trend for the minimum wage in the 1990s is not consistent 
with the pattern of inequality observed (still growing at 
higher rate in the upper tail and stabilizing, but not reversing, 
in the lower one).
The 1990s saw also a flourishing literature over the role 
of trade, probably as a by-product of the rich research over 
the effects of globalizations. According to simple models 
of comparative advantages, increasing openness with low 
skill workers endowed countries pushes US and other OECD 
countries towards more skilled intensive productions. This 
standard mechanism is not completely consistent with the 
data. As Acemoglu (2003b) underlines, the skill intensive 
commodities prices should be increasing, while they are going 
downwards and the level of inequality in LDC is (counter-
theoretically) increasing.
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) tried to capture the effect of 
outsourcing. Their story can work only for the eighties, but, 
as they suggest, probably there is a problem in their measure 
(which is built on intermediate inputs import and cannot 
really distinguish between simple intermediate inputs trade 
with other advanced countries and outsourcing). Feenstra 
and Hanson (1999) tried to compare computer investment 
and outsourcing in their effect over wage inequality. Their 
results are mixed, in the sense that changing the measure 
for computer investment the relative weight of the factors 
is not stable. 
Finally, Borjas and Ramey (1994 and 1995) present some 
empirical support and also a possible theoretical explanation 
of the role of trade deficit in durable goods in explaining the 
education premium. Empirically, they use macroeconometric 
techniques showing that this series is the only one that shows 
*This is explicitly recognized by Machin and Van Reenen (1998) in 
their conclusions.
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a common stochastic trend with the wage differentials, but 
the out of sample predictions fail at the turn of the decade 
from 1980s to 1990s. Theoretically, they think that, given 
the high level of market power showed by the firms in the 
durable good sector and the high share of low skilled workers 
employed, an increase in competition can reduce rents acting 
as a downward pressure over wages. 
In the 1997 Journal of Economic Perspectives symposium, the 
conclusions were neatly supporting the orthodoxy. Except 
for Fortin and Lemieux (1997), that strongly committed 
themselves to an institutional explanation in the flavor of 
DiNardo et al. (1996), the main conclusions in the analysis of 
demand and supply forces (Johnson, 1997; Topel, 1997) stated 
that the key role is played by technical change.
Skilled biased technological change
Developed to give an explanation to the empirical findings 
shown above, the skilled biased technical change (SBTC) 
hypothesis is a theory of directed innovation, i.e. affecting 
differently the factors relative productivity (in contrast with 
the standard neutrality assumptions).
The idea that innovation, instead of being neutral, can be 
induced to substitute or complement one of the factors dates 
back to Hicks (1932), but the general equilibrium models with 
SBTC are much more recent, since they have been developed 
in the nineties, building on the endogenous growth theory, 
à la Aghion and Howitt (1992). Its diffusion was noticeable 
outside the academy, where it
“utterly dominated the discussion in the media and policy-
making circles” (Snower, 1999).
What is the origin of the SBTC hypothesis? As we said 
above, the empirical literature that drove back the attention 
over wage inequality was competitive in spirit. Since in the 
periods under analysis both relative supply and relative 
wage of educated workers increased, taking as granted the 
assumptions, there should had been a relative demand shift.
The choice of technology as the main source of the above 
demand drift is due to the poor empirical power of alternative 
factors (mainly focused on changes between industries while 
the main variation occurs within), consequently raising the 
predictive power of the residual-shaped technical progress, 
but may have been influenced by the great debate in the 
public opinion related with the effects of information and 
communication technology (ICT).
From these first steps we can appreciate our claim about 
the normal science type of research. According to the Kuhn 
(1962)’s lexicon, once a paradigm is established in a science, 
for a long period, the effort of the scholars is addressed 
more to extend the empirical content and to realize internal 
coherence than to face the (unavoidable) weaknesses. We 
follow, for a moment, the logical path. In order to have a proof 
of the argument that only a demand shift can explain the 
increase in inequality, we need to reason by modus ponens: 
we should first prove the implication and then prove the 
hypothesis in order to deduce the thesis:
[[(p ∧ q) → s] ∧ (p ∧ q)] → s
where: p = perfect competition is in place and relative 
supply is exogenous; q = relative supply and relative wages 
increases; s = demand increases, but the reasoning proposed 
is:
[[(p ∧ q) → s] ∧ q] → s
which can be false. For instance, the above literature assumes 
perfect competition and exogeneity of the supply, but no 
argument is proposed to justify that perfect competition with 
exogenous labour supply is a reasonable description of the 
labour market. 
We know, from the two introductions to Lindbeck and 
Snower (1988) and Akerlof and Yellen (1986), that at the end of 
the 20th Century a large portion of labour economics deviated 
from the competitive and market clearing assumption over 
wages, precisely because of the lack of empirical robustness 
of competitive assumption. However, there is also a more 
subtle ideological problem. It is along the edge between 
perfect competition and market power, where the distinction 
between the SBTC literature and the other potential 
explanations comes out clearly. At the opposite, the presence 
of institutions cannot be used as a discrimen: in fact, in order 
to enlarge the empirical and theoretical content of the theory, 
scholars have added institutional features in their models; but 
adding institutions as a contour to an unquestioned core is of 
course different from reforming the core itself.
What are the keys of this success? On the one hand, science 
is not rhetoric and there is indeed evidence technology has 
played a role in the transformations that occurred in the 
labor markets. On the other hand, there are some theoretical 
and practical appeals in this theory: theoretically, it is as 
simple as possible but not simpler, in the sense that it is a 
general equilibrium theory, with endogenized growth, but 
it is elegant, clear and transparent; practically, it captures a 
large part of the common sense and empirically documented 
facts about ICT and changes in firms recruitment practice and 
internal organization.
The analogy with the Kuhn (1962)’s concept of normal 
science can be used as a guideline also with regards to the 
subsequent development of the theoretical corpus of the 
SBTC. We will now discuss part of the highly prolific internal 
debate, and that part of the research program that extended 
the empirical content of the paradigm, which we will treat in 
the next subsection.
The internal debate
Originally, the SBTC appears in two versions that can be 
called endogenous and exogenous (the distinction belongs 
to Acemoglu, 2002a). Both leave the supply of skills out of the 
picture: according to Acemoglu (2002a), the supply changes 
is due to more structural factors, like the arrival of the baby 
boom generation, the Vietnam War Draft law and the increase 
in education expenditure by the Federal Government. Both 
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models are built over an acceleration hypothesis: the demand 
drift is supposed to have taken place in the last three decades 
of the 20th Century, driving the increase in relative wage. They 
assume that the channel of transmission is given by capital-
skill complementarity: better machines are matched with 
higher skills, raising the relative productivity of the workers 
owning them. Empirical evidence of this phenomenon can 
be found in Goldin and Katz (1996) and Krusell et al. (2000). 
The endogenous SBTC has been developed by Acemoglu 
in a series of inf luential papers (Acemoglu, 1998, 2002a, 
2002b, 2003a, and 2003b) and others; the most original one is 
probably Thesmar and Thoenings (2000) for the stress on the 
organizational elements.
The model acknowledges the Neo-Schumpeterian Growth 
Theory à la Grossman and Helpmann (1993) and Aghion 
and Howitt (1992) for the setup and basic assumptions. It 
is a patent race model, included into a general equilibrium 
framework. Innovation occurs through R&D investment, and 
is spurred by profits incentives (the tribute to Schumpeter, 
1942). Perfect patent protection guarantees monopolistic 
power over the production of the new vintage. Perfect 
competition is everywhere else. The structure of the economy 
is the following: an R&D sector at the top, in the middle two 
intermediate sectors and a final good sector (the aggregator) 
at the bottom, where technology is CES.
Into this setup, Acemoglu (1998) introduces an assumption, 
which is the cornerstone of the model. In the intermediate 
sectors, two goods are produced, one in which firms use 
only a certain type of machines together with high skilled 
workers and the other in which firms use only machines and 
low skilled workers. This scheme captures the idea of capital 
skill complementarity: the firms that do research can try to 
realize new vintages matching with high educated employees 
or, at the opposite, with the low educated ones. This scheme 
is a device to introduce a demand pulled innovation process.
Historically, the latter was proposed by Schmookler (1996): 
the pattern of innovation is supposed to be driven by the 
demand perceived by the firms, so it can happen that some 
innovations are introduced only very late, since immediately 
after their invention, no market is foreseen for them (e.g. for 
the railroads case).
What are the incentives that drive the research towards 
one or the other factor? Why do the new machines 
complement skills? On the one side, there is a relative price 
effect: the scarcer factor attracts higher marginal return; on 
the other side, there is a market size effect: the less scarce 
factor represents a larger opportunity to sell the machines. 
In general equilibrium, for certain value of the elasticity 
of substitution, the second one prevails generating an 
overshooting change: an exogenous increase in the 
educated workers supply, which ceteris paribus tends to 
drive the relative wage downwards, spurs more skill-
complementary-innovation raising the skill premium (more 
than compensating the supply effect).
We will not discuss the assumption over the elasticity of 
substitution, which is a pure empirical issue, some notes can 
be found in Acemoglu (2002a).
The alternative approach, the exogenous SBTC, includes, 
among the others, Galor and Moav (2000), Caselli (1999), 
Aghion (2002) Aghion et al. (2002), and Aghion and Howitt 
(1998: chapter 9). The reference models are less homogeneous, 
but a large part has (again) a Neo-Schumpeterian flavour. 
There is a technological breakthrough in the economy, 
affecting many different sectors. This new technology is 
embodied in instruments that are largely skill specific, i.e. 
only people with a proper human capital composition can use 
the new machines. The larger the size of this type of labour 
force, the faster the transition of the overall economy from 
the old to the new regime (this intuition is due again to an old 
paper, Nelson and Phelps, 1966).
The historical subject of this revolution is the ICT, with 
the striking modifications over both organizational structure 
inside the typical firm and the recruitment and wage policies, 
with the tremendous effect in terms of capital price reduction 
(Gordon, 1990), but certainly also with its problems, like the 
computer that are everywhere except into productivity data 
(quoting a famous statement by R. Solow).*
We will linger on the approach à la Aghion and Howitt 
since it represent the workhorse for the rest of the literature. 
They use the definition of General Purpose Technology (GPT), 
taken from Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995):
“A GPT is a technological breakthrough that affects 
the entire economic system, that is, most sectors in an 
economy” (Aghion, 2002:863).
But this l iterature has point of contacts with the 
conceptualization of the techno-economic paradigm, by the 
Long Waves-Evolutionary Theory (Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Dosi, 1988; David, 1990; Freeman & Louca, 2001) and that 
of the regulatory regime, by the french Ècole de Régulation 
(Aglietta, 1976; Boyer, 1986).**
We claim that their approach is more complete in the 
sense that they don’t assume the paradigm shift to be always 
directed towards more educated people, which is more 
historically pertinent given the unskilled labour bias of the 
First Industrial Revolution.
In Aghion and Howitt (1998), the pattern of diffusion 
follows the usual logistic pattern of the epidemiologists, 
and two steps should be completed in order to arrive at 
the production: (a) firms should realize a template to start 
experimentation, and (b) they should implement a workable 
routine on the template. The rate of arrival of (a) and (b) are 
Poisson distributed and there is a social learning process: 
the higher the investment effort, the faster the transition to 
the new regime. The main difference from endogenous SBTC 
stands in the source of the innovative incentives: it is the 
technology itself that through the social learning generates 
the new opportunities, a technology push. 
The internal debate copes with the problem of harmonizing 
the obsessive focus on technology as the main if not the 
*Gordon (2000) and Oliner and Sichel (2000), in a Journal of Economic 
Perspectives symposium debate about the same data getting exactly 
the opposite conclusion. To our knowledge, this is the best example of 
the lack of a univocal story about the ICT.
**Of course, the paternity issue does not make sense since the 
differences in the conceptual frameworks are so strong that they are 
barely comparable.
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only determinant of the events, with the poor productivity 
performance (the productivity paradox) of the US until the 
second half of the 1990s. Acemoglu (2002a) defends his own 
approach invoking decreasing return to R&D, while Aghion 
(2002) quotes David (1990), that describes the difficulties faced 
in the introduction of technological breakthrough (like the 
steam engine) that sometimes took decades.
In an evolutionary perspective, the debate between 
demand pull and technology push is an old one and probably 
many scholars would argue that is missing most of the story 
(Dosi, 1988). Since this latter school sees technology as a path 
dependence, trial-and-error-mode, fundamental uncertain 
and trajectory related process, the two forces (the push and 
pull incentives) operate only once the appropriability and 
opportunities conditions are fixed (only at the margin). At the 
same time, in an evolutionary perspective the productivity 
paradox is not really a paradox! The time dimension to 
implement a new regime, the necessity to build the new 
machines (in a Hicksian perspective) and the uncertainty 
of the technology domain are all factors that justify a time 
lag before seeing the productivity raising. This poses against 
the edge between the normal science, where this reasoning 
cannot live together with the informational assumptions 
of the mainstream theory, and the out-of-the-paradigm 
research. 
This tendency to avoid relaxation of the basic assumptions 
determines certain coherence in terms of policy implications. 
The explicit introduction of the anti-union climate of those 
years (explicitly recognized by some scholars, e.g. Acemoglu, 
2002a), the change of social norms, or the difference between 
skill and education, or the existence of more than two types 
of skills (Atkinson, 2000; Howell, 1999) would probably lessen 
the coherence of the policy agenda of all this literature. In 
fact, as stated by Snower (1999:53):
“There can be no doubt that the conventional preoccupation 
with supply and demand under conditions of perfect 
information and perfect competition has a strong laissez 
faire bias.”
We can now make hints at two other minor debates 
internal to the paradigm.
First of all, there is not a consensus over the acceleration of 
the seventies versus a steady demand hypothesis. According 
to the former (to whom belong both the exogenous and the 
endogenous SBTC described above) the seventies saw a 
change in the pattern of the demand for skilled labour, while 
the latter propose a long run trend of increasing demand for 
skilled labour, with the movement of the skilled premium 
determined by the movement of the supply. Advocates of this 
latter approach are Katz and Murphy (1992), Card and Lemieux 
(2001) and Autor et al. (2005). This thesis is rejected by the 
accelerationists that insist on the computer argument and the 
change in the firms that have been induced* and the historical 
evidence over capital skill complementarity by Goldin and 
Katz (1996).
Secondly, there has been a discussion over the existence 
of a polarization. It has been recently proposed by Autor et 
al. (2003), Autor et al. (2005), and Autor et al. (2006) trying 
to defend the paradigm from the observation of Card and 
DiNardo (2002) and Gittleman and Howell (1995) over 
the differences in the tails of US wage distribution that 
we discussed above. Assuming (as in Autor et al., 2003) 
that computer capital is substitute for routine labour and 
q-complement for non-routine labour (computer raises 
the marginal productivity of non routine labour), such as 
problem solving, legal writing or communicative tasks, 
with the decline in ITC capital prices (the causal force) the 
marginal worker reallocate her supply from routine to non 
routine labour. The effect of computerization happens to 
be non monotonic, having a skill complementarity feature 
at the top of the distribution and a substitution one in the 
middle. According to Autor et al. (2006), at the beginning both 
effects operate, while in the second phase, since the decline 
in computer capital prices continue, once the substitution has 
been complete, the computerization affects only the top of 
the distribution.
Enlarging the paradigm
We want to conclude this section by showing how the supply 
demand technological change theory is structured as a 
self-contained paradigm. In the last decade, much of the 
theoretical effort was driven to incorporate new predictions 
(to increase the empirical content à la Lakatos, 1970) and 
coherence with new stylized facts, enriching the framework, 
but without weakening the core (Hernstein et al., 2005).* We 
can summarize what we claim to be the key assumptions:
1. Technology is the causal source of the change occurring 
in the labor markets.
2. Institutions can affect the direction of change but the 
main determinants are elsewhere, i.e. the economy 
under analysis is a demand-supply plus institutions 
economy.
3. The best framework is the most parsimonious: two 
factors of productions (skilled and unskilled labour) 
or three at most (adding capital), leaving aside 
heterogeneity.
4. Power is not part of the story, neither through principal-
agent nor insider-outsider considerations.
5. There is no place for social norms, political climate or 
others or, when added, they are at most affected by 
technology and not the other way round.
We can now review some of these research efforts. The 
first road that has been pursued is the supply-demand plus 
institutions. In this case there is the intention to include 
them into the picture, but again the modelling is intended 
to have as the main determinant the technology, while the 
*Bresnahan (1999) and the empirical studies reviewed in section 2.
*Again, we want to stress that this reasoning is epistemological, in the 
sense that we deal with the historical development of a theory not 
with intentional behaviour of a real hypostasis.
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institutions operate only as a contour variable. The main 
interest of this line of research was to accomplish the goal 
of having a unified causal explanation for the data of the US 
and the European Union. These areas are sharing the same 
degree of economic development and integration, have many 
other similar features with regards to other socio-economic 
variables, but they show strikingly different stylized facts 
in the period under analysis (Europe has no deep increase 
in wage inequality except for the UK, higher unemployment 
rate in all the continental part, increasing profit share, all 
elements that we do not find in the US).*
The idea of adding institutions to have a clue about Europe 
has been favoured by the high consensus in the literature that 
the wage rigidities in the Old Continent are less employment 
friendly, although not very robust (Nickel, 1997**). A new 
consensus emerged over the hypothesis that European 
regulation made the unemployment rise after the seventies 
since it reduces the ability of the economy to adjust after 
the shocks that hit the economy. This hypothesis has been 
elaborated by Blanchard (1997), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), 
referring to adverse labour demand shocks, and Bertola and 
Ichino (1995), where a general micro-economic turbulence 
occurs. It can easily be adapted to a technology shock as the 
adoption of ICT, as shown by Liunqvist and Sargent (1998). 
This thesis became famous as the Krugman’s hypothesis, 
whose formulation can be summed up as follows: there is a 
technology shock acting to raise wage inequality in developed 
countries, but in Europe the wage compression friendly 
legislation limited it at the cost of higher unemployment.
Acemoglu (2003) develops a search model in which a 
radical innovation occurs and firms should decide either to 
adopt it or not and to direct it towards skilled or unskilled 
labour. In this context the minimum wage pushes firms to 
match the new technology with unskilled labour, raising their 
productivity above the threshold. Practically, technology is 
again the main force, but no SBTC occurs and unemployment 
and wage compression are observed.
Another road that has been followed is to introduce a slight 
modification into the model, specifically designed to capture 
a particular empirical elements. Acemoglu and Zilibotti 
(2001) and Acemoglu (2003b) provide an explanation of the 
different pattern of productivity in developed and developing 
countries, Acemoglu (1999) explains the decline in wages at 
the bottom of the distribution, using a search model with 
SBTC chocks, finally Aghion et al. (2002), developing previous 
work by Violante, account for the change in within group 
inequality, using a GPT model with segmentation.
Finally, a strand of the literature conserves the main set 
up, but work mainly through a redefinition of concepts. The 
model of the economy is almost the same, but what has 
been called technological revolution is now organizational 
revolution (obviously spurred by ICT). Beaudry and Green 
(2003) use a model of technological adoption (on a frontier 
in which two different organizational forms are available) 
to explain the differences (commented above) between US 
and Germany. Although quite elegant and innovative in the 
focus over the accumulation of physical capital*, the paper 
is indicative of what we said about the parsimoniousness. 
Although trying to explain the changes through the adoption 
of organizational forms, explicitly: 
“Remains agnost ic regarding precise forces (e.g. 
institutions, supply changes, or political economy forces) 
that have led [the different patterns]” (Beaudry & Green, 
2003:575).
Questioning the paradigm: empirical problems
There is a literature that runs parallel with the conventional 
wisdom illustrated above: its main scope is to face the 
weaknesses and in general the missing points of the 
mainstream explanation. Methodologically, a large body of 
empirical works makes it. As we will see, some of the critiques 
illustrate evident aporiae that are very difficult to avoid 
leaving the core untouched. Did this fact block the research 
program of the normal science? The answer is negative, and 
epistemologically, it is not surprising. In fact, all theories 
have problems, missing pieces, internal contradictions but 
once a paradigm is established, scholars have a guideline 
for research, a large body of questions to answer, a setup 
to work on. It is then more efficient to exploit the paradigm 
as much as possible, i.e. until an alternative paradigm is 
sufficiently developed. If this last claim is true, then making 
a large collection of empirical puzzles is important but cannot 
represent a strategy to develop an alternative theory. At the 
opposite, as shown by Feyerabend (1993), putting together 
confuted theories can sometimes be a more successful 
strategy than just writing a list of the situations where an 
explanation conflict with data.
Among the others, there was a bunch of papers that where 
openly discussed by the mainstream, which baptized them 
the revisionists (Autor et al., 2005). We refer to DiNardo et 
al. (1996), DiNardo and Pischke (1997), DiNardo and Lemieux 
(1997), Fortin and Lemieux (1997), Lee (1999), and Lemieux 
(2002 and 2006). They argue the following things: (a) the 
upsurge in wage inequality is rather episodic and we should 
be cautious in isolating any kind of trend; (b) the causal 
factors at work are mainly institutional, like minimum wage 
decline and de-unionization.
In Card and DiNardo (2002), we can see the series of the US 
minimum wage in real terms. It declined substantially and 
continually for all the eighties, with an abrupt inversion at the 
end of the decade and a consecutive stabilization. According 
to these authors, the downward trend allows inequality to 
emerge, and, together with de-unionization and the change 
*We should keep in mind that a unified story for Europe is very 
difficult given country differences.
**Once put in the simplest form, the argument is obviously time-
inconsistent, since regulation was there even in the sixties where 
European performance was above the mean. In general, Nickell 
shows that there are differences throughout Europe, while the level 
of regulation is quite similar, and in general that empirically the 
employment effect, if present, changes from one institution to the other.
*Whose role has been recognized by Beaudry and Green (2005) also for 
wage inequality in the US.
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in skill composition, represents the main determinant of the 
empirical findings of 1980s.
Other papers addressed more specific points. Card 
and DiNardo (2002), for example, question the computer 
explanation since blacks, who on average are less likely to 
use computer than whites, are relatively gaining in the last 
part of the century. Using data disaggregated for the types of 
college degree, they show also that no significant premium 
exists for the computer skill graduated. Finally, they argue 
that an upsurge of inequality in the eighties seems difficult to 
reconcile with the ICT boom, which is a 1990s phenomenon.
DiNardo and Pischke (1997) object over the direction of 
causality. They show that pencil and other office tools are 
associated with higher wages as much as computer, arguing 
that it is not a treatment effect but a selection problem: 
workers with higher wages are more likely too use these tools 
on the job.
With regards to Card and DiNardo (2002), we believe that 
the first and the third critiques are not very significant: the 
black and white gap is shrinking because of the civil right 
movement and better access to school, while the timing 
problem is not a paradox if we accept the evolutionary 
perspective that the new machines need time to be completely 
understood and made workable. The timing objection can also 
be reversed. First of all, while the decrease of bottom wages 
and the increase in the 50th-10th differential are concentrated 
in the 1980s, as we said before, in the upper tail the upward 
trend continues also for all the nineties. In fact, when Lemieux 
(2002) proposes a unifying framework honestly admits that it 
does not work for the upper tail. Secondly, the lack of general 
equilibrium effects can raise doubts on robustness. In table 
1 we summarized the main findings of their decomposition 
exercises. 
The second set of works addressed presumed inconsistencies 
of the supply-demand plus institutions hypothesis as a means 
of explaining the differences between the US and the EU. 
Snower (1999) shows that in OECD data there is not a trade 
off between inequality and unemployment; certainly, if a 
relation exists, at least statistically, it seems to be positive 
(Galbraith et al., 1999). If the Krugman’s hypothesis had been 
true, Europe would have experienced an unskilled labour 
unemployment crisis; a prediction that is at odds with the 
measured unemployment rates, that are not significantly 
different through educational groups (Nickell & Bell, 1996; 
Nickell, 1997). Following the same line of reasoning, Europe 
should have experienced an increase in dispersion in the upper 
tail, which is again in conflict with data (Atkinson, 2000). 
Howell et al. (2007) raise doubts over the “confidence with 
which it is concluded […] that labor market rigidities are 
indeed at the root of poor employment performance” (Howell 
et al., 2007:50), given that the low magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients are deeply in contrast with the authoritative 
tone of the policy conclusion. In fact, many of these studies 
rely on poor quality data, and once better measurement of 
institutional variables have become available, the replication 
openly reverses the findings. For example, Howell et al. (2007) 
find a robust positive correlation only between unemployment 
and benefit generosity, but a Granger-Causality test argues in 
favor of the opposite direction, consistently with a political 
economy explanation (more demand for protection in 
presence of higher unemployment). 
Finally, we discuss the findings of Piketty and Saez (2003) 
and Becker and Gordon (2005), giving emphasis to the top 
of the distribution. Although based on household (instead 
of individual) wage inequality, the main stylized facts are 
consistent with the standard ones.
The origin of inequality cannot be technological, say 
Becker and Gordon (2005), if “only the top 10 percent of the 
income distribution enjoyed a growth rate of total real income 
(excluding capital gains) equal to or above the average rate of 
economywide productivity growth” (Becker/Gordon, 2005:59) 
as it happened in the US. In general, the boom is “very large 
and concentrated among the highest income earners” (Piketty 
& Saez, 2003:34).
They conclude that the increasing share of the upper decile 
and the increasing skewness inside this decile accounts for 
almost all the extra income gains. 
The subjects that benefited from these extra gains seem 
to be CEOs, whose compensation exploded in this period, 
also because of the stock options, that are included in the 
compensation for US accountancy rules. In figure 1 we 
confront the average wage together with those of the top 10 
and top 100 CEOs. The ratio between the two is dramatically 
increasing. According to the authors, these types of job are 
very unlikely to be determined by technological factors, 
because of the bargaining power they have, since they are 
the only category which can fix its own pay, and because of 
the weight of social norms, ultimately, in fact: “executive 
pay is probably determined to a significant extent by herd 
behaviour” (Piketty & Saez, 2003:35).
Is there a coherent alternative story?
Let’s start by stating that a negative answer should be given to 
the title of this section. On the one side, there is a genuine lack 
of consensus among the critical scholars, which also belong 
to different disciplines. On the other side, we should keep in 
mind that data argue in favour of a multi-causal explanation. 
In fact, it has been underlined that the upper and lower tails 
of the distribution seem to respond to forces that are partially 
Table 1. Quantitative effect of Institutions for the Wage 
Inequality in the US, various studies, all with semi-
parametric approaches.
 Minimum Wage effect Unions effect
 DiNardo et al [1996], period 1978-1988
Men 25.00% 13.89%
Women 30.00% 11.11%




 DiNardo and Lemieux [1997], period 1981-1988
All 22.00% 9.60%
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different. While, in the former, we have a continuous increase 
all over the period and an increasing skewness towards the very 
top, in the latter, we have a decade (the eighties) of increasing 
dispersion and decreasing real wages and in the following 
decade a stabilization. At the same time, clearly we cannot 
assume that the top decile and the rest of the distribution 
between 50th and 90th percentile are shaped by the same 
forces, given evidence over the bargaining power of categories 
like the CEOs that are largely represented in the former.
The baseline of all these theory is the emphasis (a) over 
the residual inequality, which is no longer deemed to be a 
measurement error, but instead as the normal situation of an 
unavoidably segmented labour market; (b) over the problem 
of internal organization of the firm, in a framework which is 
more Coasian than Walrasian.
A possible alternative wisdom is the institutional 
perspective, based on the range theory of wages. According 
to this interpretation, proposed for example by Howell 
(1999), demand and supply, and through them the degree 
of international competition, technology, demography, and 
immigration can define only a large set of possible wage 
profiles, among which the choice is left to bargaining between 
firms and workers. The distribution of power between 
them is influenced by social norms, political climate and 
institutions. The change in fundamentals (globalization, 
massive migration and ICT boom) impact differently over 
skill groups, because of the decline in the sheltering power 
of institutions. At the same time, after the seventies there 
was a general redistribution of power, because of the abrupt 
change in the political climate —as an example, Howell (1999) 
evokes the Reagan’s intervention in the PATCO strike—. 
There is also a theoretical conceptualization of this political 
revolution of the eighties, also called Neo-Liberalism: a 
normative system which considers the perfect market as the 
optimal institutional framework and tries to design both state 
interventions and governance systems in order to (re)produce 
its outcome (Harvey, 2005). As stressed by Foucault (2004), 
the Neo-Liberal State is not reducing its weight, but simply 
re-directing its effort from sheltering some social groups and 
redistributing, to correcting, creating, and integrating the real 
markets in order to move towards the ideal ones. There was a 
peculiar pressure over unions, because they were considered 
as the main pillar of the anti-competitive labour market of the 
Fordist system.* According to these authors, the Neo-Liberal 
thinkers see the battle to free the market as a fight to restore 
freedom. 
Alternatively, we may think at a labour market where 
certain social norms concur as behavioural elements in the 
action choices of the parties involved. For example, wage 
policies that include redistribution among different groups 
of workers can be accepted as a social code; a change in the 
norms, such as more tolerance towards earning dispersion on 
the workplace can pave the way to an increase in inequality, 
because of less unionized plants or a simple generational 
effect (Atkinson, 2000). In a similar fashion, one can focus 
over an effect of the conflictual relationship of the seventies, 
that determines a restructuring activity by firms that hits 
different segments according to their bargaining power, 
damaging especially the unskilled workers (Sabel, 1982). There 
is also a large sociological literature in favour of a similar 
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Figure 1 – Average and CEO wage, US 1970-2000.
*See the already quoted PATCO episode, or the intervention of Mrs. 
Thatcher against the miners’ strike.
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over the behaviour of the big companies, that in the post II 
World War kept a cooperative approach with unions, but, 
after the 1970s shocks, joined small firms’ aggressive stance 
(for example, in the battle for Right-To-Work Laws), since 
they were perceiving as a threat the lack of flexibility of the 
current system. Quoting from one of those:
“By the 1970s, […] a changed world economy convinced [the 
multinational corporations] that confronting organized 
labor was necessary for business success: they joined with 
small and large local businesses that had pursued such 
anti-union activities” (Canak & Miller, 1990: 269).
It is a matter of facts that at the turn between the seventies 
and the eighties, large re-direction of investment away from 
unionized plants, where for example the employment shrank 
by 25% between 1979 and 1982 (Piore & Sabel, 1984).
Finally, the last body of research that can be quoted is 
focused on the reorganization of the workplace and the 
system of shop-floor relations. The technology is deemed 
to have played a role, but the microfoundation of the labour 
market is completely different, usually including power 
relations through insider-outsider or efficiency-wages models. 
This striking difference allows the ICT to have non monotonic 
effects.
Snower (1999) uses the term of organizational revolution 
to sum up the changes occurring: (a) in physical capital, with 
the new multiple purpose machines; (b) in informational 
f lows, with the ICT; (c) in human capital, with a greater 
span of competence by the typical educated worker, and (d) 
in work preferences, with a stronger preference for variety 
by employees. According to this theory, the typical firm 
organization shifts from a tayloristic (high differentiation of 
task, pyramidal structured) to a holistic (customer oriented 
teams, network structured) one (Lindbeck & Snower, 1996, 
2000), redefining the set of skills required by the market, and 
consequently raising the differential between the old-style 
and the new-style workers (Snower, 1999).
Skott and Guy (2007) choose instead an eff iciency 
wages setup. In their paper, the new technology raises the 
monitoring ability by firms and the dispersion increases 
according to the abilities of groups to avoid control. This is in 
line with the evidence from UK social surveys (Green, 2006) 
that the new technology and the new organizational systems 
are perceived as both lowering the quality of job and effort 
biased, i.e. paying more but extracting more.
The intuition behind these models comes from a rich body 
of research from labour relations studies. Piore and Sabel 
(1984) and Boyer (1988), for example, describe the collapse 
of the Fordist system of regulation, perceived as inadequate 
in a changing global environment because it was relying too 
much on scale factors, neglecting the flexibility issue (Dosi, 
1988), and show how the introduction of lean production 
occurred. Kelly (1990) stresses the role of the new philosophy 
of management, based on the reduction of the sources of 
conflict at the shop floor level, where also the words can be 
fundamental, e.g. the use of downsizing instead of firing, total 
quality management instead of increasing effort, means of 
feedback and development instead of surveillance.
Conclusions
In this paper we reviewed one of the most important recent 
economic debate, raised over the transformations occurring 
in the distribution of income in the US and the role played 
by technological progress. Originated by a simple hypothesis 
based on the trends emerging from Mincer equation 
estimations, in less than a decade this approach became a 
candidate explanation for almost all the phenomena that 
advanced capitalist economies are facing. It represents now 
a general interpretation of the events occurring ending in the 
political debate, especially in Europe, where it is now on the 
core of the agenda. 
We analyzed US wage distribution along many different 
dimensions in the last three decades of the last century and 
we discussed the way in which the same data have been looked 
at. We reconstructed the theoretical background of all those 
works, showing that they share to the same basic roots. This 
is helpful if the objective is the understanding of the weight 
that this literature has in the policy debate. At the same time, 
we try to give an answer to the question that many scholars 
seemed to pose: why did it happen that so many precise and 
detailed critiques were not able to substitute the conventional 
wisdom? We used an epistemological perspective, arguing that 
only in a paradigm-related framework the above puzzle can be 
recomposed. We reviewed step by step the research program 
of the conventional wisdom, discussing the weakness, but 
showing the advantages of a coherent, simple and extendable 
setup, as those offered by the paradigmatic explanation.
We concluded with a detailed description of what 
Kuhn (1962) would have called the revolutionary science: 
the theoretical perspectives that questioned the core 
assumptions of the mainstream consensus. We claimed that 
the edge between the two theories runs along the different 
conceptualization of the labour market: competitive in the 
one case, shaped by power distribution in the second case. 
Inside the theoretical effort of those alternative strands of 
literature, we were not able to find a unique pattern, which 
implies the absence of a unified policy agenda.
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